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Turbulent Times at Treasury: Applying the 
Appointments Clause to IRS Appeals Officers 
 
CHRISTOPHER DYKZEUL 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
When a wealthy drug dealer claims you owe her $20,000 what do 
you do?  Maybe you say “no, there’s been a mistake, you have the wrong 
person.”  But what if the drug dealer remains adamant you owe her the full 
$20,000?  She tells you the only way to convince her to a lesser amount is 
by taking your claim to her cousin, who is hired and employed by the drug 
dealer to handle all her money disputes.  The obvious problem here is in the 
relationship between the cousin and the drug dealer.  Even if the cousin is a 
neutral arbitrator, his close relationship to the drug dealer reeks of 
impropriety.  After all, the cousin and the drug dealer are family relatives 
and may even share financial rapport.  Therefore, a person would have good 
reason to doubt the impartiality of any decision made by the cousin to affirm 
a debt owed to the drug dealer.  
It may seem absurd to liken the IRS to a drug dealer, but the above 
scenario is comparable to the IRS appeals process. A taxpayer who owes 
money to the IRS may dispute their debt before an IRS Appeals Officer 
(AO).  However, much like the drug dealers’ cousin, the AO is both hired 
and employed by the IRS.  AOs not only share familial relations with the 
IRS by being part of the same executive department, the two also share 
financial and collegial rapport with each other.  Thus, regardless if AOs are 
truly neutral while arbitrating a taxpayer’s appeal, their close relationship to 
the IRS reeks of impropriety; and even appearances of impropriety are 
                                                 
 Christopher Dykzeul is a Deputy City Attorney for the City and County of San Francisco 
and is a graduate of the University of California Hastings College of the Law where he 
concentrated his legal studies in tax law.  This publication was awarded an Honorable 
Mention by The Theodore Tannenwald, Jr. Foundation for Excellence in Tax Scholarship in 
the Fall of 2019 
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enough to strip away public confidence1 in the independence of a decision 
maker.2 
This paper begins from a simple premise: requiring IRS AOs to be 
appointed as inferior Officers under the Appointments Clause will 
effectively mitigate existing appearances of impropriety currently borne by 
such Officers.3  Specifically, subjecting AOs to the Appointments Clause 
relieves notions of impropriety in two ways.  First, because the authority to 
appoint AOs will be given to an external entity, the IRS can no longer 
“choose the judge in its own cause.”4 In other words, the IRS cannot be 
accused of hiring AOs that are sympathetic to agency agendas if AOs are 
appointed externally.  Second, because the power to remove is incident to 
the power to appoint,5 the IRS can no longer use the prospect of termination 
to influence AO decisions if AOs are appointed and removed by an external 
authority.  Thus, this paper argues that IRS AOs meet the necessary 
requirements to be classified as inferior Officers under the Appointments 
Clause and therefore should be appointed by a Court of law for reasons of 
impartiality. 
                                                 
 1.  Public confidence in the IRS has generally fallen. In 2003, 32% of public 
respondents reported having little or no confidence in the IRS.  In 2013, that number rose to 
57% of respondents reporting a lack of confidence in the IRS. Scott Clement, The IRS’ 
Approval Ratings are Free Fallin’, WASH. POST (May 28, 2013), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2013/05/28/the-irs-approval-ratings-are-free-
fallin/?utm_term=.dd383a086a1d. 
 2.  See Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Presiding Officials Today, 46 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 271, 280 (1994) (showing that twenty-six percent of ALJs for the SSA perceive agency 
pressure to rule differently); see also Taxpayer Bill of Rights, Pub. L. No. 114-113, § 
401(a)(3)(E), 112 Stat. 2242, 3117 (2015) (codified at I.R.C. § 7803(a)(3)(E)) (stating 
taxpayers have “the right to appeal a decision of the [IRS] in an independent forum …”) 
(emphasis added); see also Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 1001(a)(4), 112 Stat. 685 (1998) (codified 
at I.R.C. § 7801) (requiring the Treasury Secretary to “ensure an independent appeals function 
within the [IRS]”); see also Bernard Schwartz, Adjudication and the Administrative 
Procedures, 32 TUL. L. REV. 203, 207 (1996) (explaining the theory of separation to insulate 
the person judging for the agency); see also In Re Larson, 86 A.2d 430, 435 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1952) (“the combination of functions violates the ancient tenet of Anglo-American 
justice that ’[n]o man shall be a judge in his own cause.’”). 
 3.  See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 912 (1991) (considering the independent 
exercise of judicial and executive power to be incongruent). 
 4.  Kent H. Barnett, Resolving the ALJ Quandary, 66 VAN. L. REV. 797, 848 (2013) 
[hereinafter ALJ Quandary] (citing Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 886 
(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 5.  See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 
3161 (2010); see also Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 515 (1920) (“The power to 
remove is, in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, an incident of the power to 
appoint.”). 
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Determining whether a federal actor is an inferior Officer—and thus 
subject to the Appointment Clause—entails an in-depth examination of the 
position they hold, the office within which they work, and the scope of 
authority assigned to them. 6 Therefore, the following section of this paper 
discusses the Office of IRS Appeals7 within which AOs perform their central 
duties to adjudicate and settle tax liabilities before litigation.8  Understanding 
the history and structure of IRS Appeals provides a foundation to better 
understand the duties and scope of authority assigned to AOs, which is 
necessary to apply the legal framework of the Appointments Clause. That 
framework is examined in section three of this paper, which looks at two 
Court opinions holding AOs outside the purview of the Appointment Clause.  
Those opinions are contradicted by the Supreme Court’s recent holding in 
Lucia v. SEC, which builds on prior jurisprudence by clarifying that an 
Officer, as defined under the Appointments Clause, need only to have final 
decision making authority “in some instances.”9 The Supreme Court’s 
analysis in Lucia is applied to AOs in section four of this paper, and section 
five provides a series of policy arguments for requiring the application of the 
Appointments Clause to AOs.  Lastly, section six of this paper compares the 
possible methods to appoint AOs and argues that appointment by the Courts 
is the most method viable for reasons of impartiality.  
 
II. THE STRUCTURE AND PURPOSE OF IRS APPEALS AND  
ITS OFFICERS 
 
IRS Appeals has one main purpose:  to settle cases before litigation.  
AOs were created to assist the Office of Appeals in fulfilling that purpose by 
overseeing all administrative appeals, and ultimately deciding whether or not 
to compromise the liability in question.  To fully understand the role of an 
IRS Appeals Officer, it is necessary to understand the structure and purpose 
of IRS Appeals.  After all, the authority of an AO is limited to the authority 
delegated to the Office of Appeals.  This section provides an overview of 
why IRS Appeals was created, its initial authority, and the evolution and 
scope of its role within the IRS.  This examination, in turn, will establish a 
                                                 
 6.  See generally Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) (holding SEC ALJs subject to 
the Appointment’s Clause because they held offices established by law and wielded 
significant authority). 
 7.  The IRS Office of Appeals is also referred to as “Office of Appeals,” “IRS Appeals,” 
or “Appeals Office.” 
 8.  IRS, HISTORY OF APPEALS, IRS DOC. 7225, at 1 (1987) [hereinafter IRS Doc. 7225]. 
 9.  Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2066.  
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foundation from which to better understand the role of an AO and the 
authority they wield under the current structure of the IRS.    
A. The Creation of IRS Appeals  
 
IRS Appeals has developed alongside the US Tax Court, which 
traces back to the Committee on Appeals and Review (the Committee).  The 
Committee was created in 1918 by the IRS Commissioner as means to 
adjudicate tax controversy within the IRS.10  The Committee, however, had 
only limited authority to settle cases.  For example, it was “directly 
responsible to the Commissioner and could act only in an advisory capacity.  
Thus, the Commissioner was theoretically free to disregard Committee 
recommendations.”11  The Commissioner’s restraint over Committee 
recommendations was ultimately removed by the Revenue Act of 1921;12 
which made two additional contributions to the appeals process.  First, the 
1921 Act afforded appeal rights to all taxpayers.13  Second, the Act granted 
the Committee final decision making authority over such appeals.14  The Act 
effectively increased the number of annual appeals and caused the 
Committee to significantly expand, nearly quadrupling in size over a two-
year period.15  However, the Committee’s expansion was not enough to 
handle the appeal load, which ultimately lead to the Committee being 
replaced by the Board of Tax Appeals, in 1924.16  
Two major issues led to the replacement of the Committee.  First, 
the Committee was not independent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.17  
The Tax Simplification Board18 reviewed this issue and found that “it would 
never be possible to give to the taxpayer the fair and independent review to 
which [she is rightly entitled] as long as the appellate tribunal is directly 
                                                 
 10.  The Committee was the first adjudicatory body created by the Commissioner and 
organized within the IRS. See 1920 COMM’R OF INT. REV. REP. 14–15. 
 11.  Harold Dubroff & Brant J. Hellwig, THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT: AN 
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS, 42–45 (2d ed. 2014) [hereinafter Historical Analysis] (“The Solicitor 
of Internal Revenue reviewed Committee decisions on behalf of the Commissioner and 
readily exercised authority to amend or reverse them.”); see also REPORT OF TAX 
SIMPLIFICATION BOARD, H.R. DOC. NO. 68-103, at 2 (1923). 
 12.  Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, ch. 136, § 250(d), 42 Stat. 227, 265. 
 13.  Id. § 1309, 42 Stat. 310. 
 14.  Id.  
 15.  Historical Analysis, supra note 11, at 43. 
 16.  COMM’R OF INT. REV. REP. 11 (1924). 
 17.  See A.E. Graupner, The Operation of the Board of Tax Appeals, 3 NAT’L INC. TAX 
MAG. 295 (1925) (describing the issue that Committee recommendations were mere 
settlements of disputed issues rather than judicial determinations of legal questions). 
 18.  Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-98, ch. 136, § 1327, 42 Stat. 317 (creating the 
Tax Simplification Board to investigate the administration of the internal revenue laws). 
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under, and its recommendations subject to the approval of, the [O]fficer 
whose duty it is to administer the law and collect the tax.”19  A second flaw 
was the Committee’s lack of procedural due process.  The informal and 
private nature of Committee hearings allowed taxpayers to settle liabilities 
behind closed doors.20  These private hearings encouraged inconsistent 
settlements resulting in large refunds to some taxpayers but not others.21  
This led to public demands for more transparency and “equal applicability 
of the law” within the appeals process.22  
Congress addressed public concerns by creating more formal appeal 
procedures in the 1924 Revenue Act.23  The Act replaced the Committee with 
the Board of Tax Appeals (the Board), an “independent executive branch 
agency that would later evolve into the U.S. Tax Court.”24  The Board was 
analogous to a judicial forum, with appointments made by the President of 
United States.25  However, the Board’s decisions were “not final on the 
question of liability.”26  Thus, the Government could appeal unfavorable 
decisions to Federal Court.27  Importantly, the Board had formal procedures.  
These included public hearings with written findings of fact, and even 
written opinions.28  The Board’s formal procedures, however, slowed the 
appeals process.29  
To expedite the tax appeals process, the IRS Commissioner formed 
an independent Special Advisory Committee in 1927 that would later evolve 
into IRS Appeals.30  The Advisory Committee “functioned essentially as a 
settlement agency exercising the discretion vested in the Commissioner.”31  
                                                 
 19.  1924 COMM’R OF INTL. REV. ANN. REP. 12; see also 65 CONG. REC. 2614, 2684 
(1924) (remarks of Mr. Young). 
 20.  Historical Analysis, supra note 11, at 47. 
21 .  See, e.g., Sully, Those Refunded Millions, SATURDAY EVENING POST, June 21, 1924, 
at 36. 
 22.  Historical Analysis, supra note 11, at 47 (“The creation of the board represented a 
victory for those forces of righteousness demanding absolute precision and equal applicability 
of the law without fear or favor.”).   
 23.  Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, §1100(a), 43 Stat. 253. 
 24.  Andrew Strekla & Sean Morrison, The IRS and America’s Longest Running ADR 
Program, FED. L. PUB., Nov. 2016 at 28. 
 25.  Historical Analysis, supra note 11, at 63.  
 26.  Id. at 122.  
 27.  Id. at 56.  
 28.  Historical Analysis, supra note 11, at 93 (clarifying that written opinions were 
required for cases involving more than $10,000). 
 29.  National Archives, Record of the Treasury Dep’t, Record Group 56, Tax – Board of 
Tax Appeals 1923. “The board [had] more cases to pass on and less informal practice, and, 
therefore, greater delay upon each case than [the Committee].” 
 30.  Strekla & Morrison, supra note 24, at 28. 
 31.  Id. 
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The Advisory Committee had limited authority,32 and its procedures were 
informal, allowing taxpayers to petition without fear of technical 
objections.33  In 1933, the Advisory Committee was replaced by a group 
known as Technical Staff, which was given increased authority to settle 
cases.34  Specifically, Technical Staff “had the authority to bind the IRS in 
matters of $5,00035 or less for any one tax year.”36 The Technical Staff went 
through several reorganizations, each increasing in authority throughout 
time.37  Finally, in 1978 the IRS Appeals Division was created.38   
 
B. The Current Structure of IRS Appeals  
 
The structure of IRS Appeals (hereafter Appeals or Office of 
Appeals) was first described in Rev. Proc. 78-1,39 and was further defined by 
Treasury Regulations in 1987.40  Throughout its history, the structure of IRS 
Appeals has emphasized the informal nature of its proceedings.41  For 
example, the regulations make clear that testimony is not taken under oath, 
and matters alleged as facts are taken as such.42  Importantly, IRS Appeals 
has exclusive and final authority to determine liability for most taxes at the 
administrative level.43  This authority also includes complete settlement 
                                                 
 32.  See IRS Doc. 7225, supra note 8, at 1 (clarifying the Special Advisory Committee 
could review cases only where a notice of deficiency had been issued).  
 33.  Strekla & Morrison, supra note 24, at 29.  
 34.  IRS Doc. 7225, supra note 8, at 1.  
 35.  See CPI Inflation Calculator, Bureau of Labor Statics, for calculation that 5,000 in 
1933 is equivalent to $97,377.13 in 2018 U.S. dollars, https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_cal 
culator.htm (last visited 2/9/2019). 
 36.  Strekla & Morrison, supra note 24, at 28. 
 37.  Id. (“Technical Staff became ‘the Appellate Division’ in 1952, and as the 
jurisdiction of the Appellate Division increased, its employees changed titles from ‘technical 
advisors’ to ‘appellate conferees,’ and finally to the current title of ‘appeals officers’ in 
1978.”).   
 38.  Id. 
 39.  REV. PROC. 78-1, C.B. 550 (1978). 
 40.  See Treas. Reg. § 601.106.  
 41.  Id. (clarifying that no testimony is taken under oath). 
 42.  Treas. Reg. § 601.106(c).  
 43.  Treas. Reg. § 601.106(d)(2)(ii).  See also James E. Merritt, How to Handle a Tax 
Controversy at the IRS and in Court. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE (October, 1996) and 
I.R.S. PUB. NO. 556 (clarifying that to receive attorney fees, the taxpayer must “apply for 
administrative costs within 90 days of the date on which the final decision of the IRS Office 
of Appeals … was mailed to you.”) (emphasis added).  
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powers.44  Under this broad authority, IRS Appeals is able to accomplish its 
mission to settle tax liabilities before litigation.45 
Initially, IRS Appeals was not acknowledged by statute.46  It was 
instead recognized only by Treasury Regulations, Revenue Procedures, and 
the IRS Manual.47  That all changed when Congress passed the Restructuring 
and Reform Act (RRA), in 1998.48  The RRA responded to public requests 
for a more taxpayer-centered appeals process by establishing broad statutory 
rights of appeal.49  The Act addressed public concern in two ways.  First, the 
Act directed the Treasury Secretary to “ensure an independent appeals 
function” within the IRS, including a “prohibition of ex parte 
communications between AOs and other Internal Revenue Service 
employees.”50  This effectively echoed the Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights, which, 
under Section 7803, granted taxpayers a “right to appeal a decision of the 
IRS in an independent forum.”51  IRS Appeals was restructured within the 
RRA to be that “independent” forum.52  The impartial and independent 
nature of IRS Appeals has since been reiterated within numerous IRS 
publications and statutes.53 
Second, the RRA granted taxpayers a statutory right of appeal, 
otherwise referred to as a Collection Due Process (CDP) hearing, “which 
allow[s] taxpayers to appeal lien, levy, or seizure actions proposed by the 
IRS.”54  Under the RRA, CDP hearings were to be conducted within IRS 
Appeals.55 The RRA further allowed IRS Appeals to “retain jurisdiction with 
                                                 
 44.  See MICHAEL SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, ¶9.01[2] (2nd ed. 2002).  
See also Treas. Reg. § 601.106(a)(1)(i) (“The Appeals office will have exclusive settlement 
jurisdiction … over cases docketed in the Tax Court.”). 
 45.  IRS Doc. 7225, supra note 8, at 7.  
 46.  See SALTZMAN, supra note 44 (clarifying that vague references to an appeal unit 
could be found in I.R.C. § 7429, which called for review of jeopardy assessments in localized 
offices. Other references are found in I.R.C. § 7430, which permits taxpayers to recover 
litigation costs after the taxpayer exhausts all administrative remedies). 
 47.  Id.  
 48.  Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
206, 112 Stat. 685 [hereinafter RAA]. 
 49.  See SALTZMAN, supra note 44. 
 50.  RRA, supra note 48, at §1001. 
 51.  I.R.C. § 7803(a)(3)(E).  
 52.  RRA, supra note 48, at § 1001(a)(4). 
 53.  Your Rights as a Taxpayer, IRS Pub. No. 1, 64731W, at 1 (2017) (“Taxpayers are 
entitled to a fair and impartial administrative appeal of most IRS decisions …”) (emphasis 
added).  See also I.R.C. § 7122(e)(1) (entitling taxpayers to “an independent administrative 
review of any rejection of a proposed offer-in-compromise …”) (emphasis added).   
 54.  S. Rep. No. 105-174 at 92, (1998). 
 55.  I.R.C. § 6320(b) (giving IRS Appeals the authority to oversee all taxpayer appeals 
against notices of intent to file a lien); I.R.C. § 6330(b) (giving IRS Appeals the authority to 
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respect to any determination made,”56 and even authorized IRS Appeals to 
settle matters on docket before the U.S. Tax Court.57  Importantly, the RRA 
required all CDP hearings to be conducted by an “[i]mpartial officer … who 
has had no prior involvement with respect to the [contested matter].”58  Those 
“[i]mpartial officer[s]” are referred to as “[A]ppeals [O]fficers.”59 
 
C. The Scope and Authority of IRS Appeal Officers 
 
All CDP hearings conducted within IRS Appeals are heard by an 
IRS AO.60  The AO position has existed in one form or another long before 
the RRA.61  However, the RRA codified the authority for Appeals Officers 
under IRC Sections 6330 and 6320.  Those statutes make clear that AOs are 
to be the aforementioned “impartial officers” tasked with conducting CDP 
hearings.62  AOs are also vested with exclusive authority to determine tax 
liability,63 issue notices of deficiencies,64 and even settle cases on behalf of 
the IRS Commissioner.65  
Within the broad scope of authority given to AOs there are certain 
statutorily mandated duties.  First, before issuing any final determination as 
to liability after conducting a CDP hearing,  “[t]he [AO] shall at the hearing 
obtain verification from the Secretary that the requirements of any applicable 
law or administrative procedure have been met.”66 Second, AOs must 
consider all relevant issues raised by the taxpayer in the hearing, including 
spousal defenses,67 the appropriateness of collection actions,68 as well as any 
alternatives to collections.69  Third, in making a determination, the AO must 
                                                 
oversee all appeals of levy notices); I.R.C. § 7122(e) (giving statutory right to taxpayers to 
appeal any denied Offer in Compromise). 
 56.  I.R.C. § 6330(d)(3).  
 57.  See Treas. Reg. § 601.106(a)(1)(i).  
 58.  I.R.C. §§ 6330(b)(3), 6320(b)(2).  
 59.  I.R.C. §§ 6330(c)(1), 6330(c)(3).  
 60.  See I.R.C. §§ 6330(c)(1) and 6330(c)(3) (The [AO] shall at the [CDP] hearing obtain 
verification from the Secretary that the requirements of any applicable law or administrative 
procedure have been met.”). 
 61.  IRS Doc. 7225, supra note 8, at 5 (explaining that “[i]n 1965, the name of settlement 
officer was changed from ‘Technical Advisor’ to ‘Appellate Conferee.’  It was subsequently 
changed to ‘Appeals Officer’ in October of 1978.”). 
 62.  See I.R.C. §§ 6320(b)(3), 6330(b)(3), 6330(c)(1)-(3).  
 63.  Treas. Reg. § 601.106(d)(2)(ii). 
 64.  Id.  
 65.  Treas. Reg. § 601.106(a)(1)(i).  
 66.  I.R.C. § 6330(c)(1).  
 67.  I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2)(A)(i). 
 68.  I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2)(A)(ii). 
 69.  I.R.C. § 6330(c)(2)(A)(iii). 
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consider  “whether any proposed collection action balances the need for the 
efficient collection of taxes with the legitimate concern of the person that 
any collection action be no more intrusive than necessary.”70  
Although taxpayers may petition Tax Court to review an AO 
determination, 71 it is often necessary for taxpayers to first bring their case 
before an AO as a prerequisite to bringing their case before Tax Court.  One 
example is where a taxpayer wants to qualify for an award of attorney fees.72 
To qualify, the taxpayer must first exhaust all administrative remedies, 
including their right to a CDP hearing before an AO.73 Another example is 
where the taxpayer received no deficiency notice, which is required to 
petition Tax Court for review.74 Specifically, where no deficiency notice is 
received,75 the taxpayer must first request a CDP hearing to receive a formal 
deficiency notice from an AO.76 Thus, AOs often act as the “gatekeepers” to 
Tax Court because they are authorized to determine liability and issue 
deficiency notices, which are prerequisites for Tax Court jurisdiction.77 
Because of this broad authority, some taxpayers have argued that AOs wield 
too much power to be considered mere employees, and should instead be 
considered Officers of the United States, which are subject to appointment 
under the U.S. Constitution.78 
 
III. THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE 
 
This section provides an overview of the scope of the Appointments 
Clause and its prior application to AOs by the Courts.  This cursory overview 
will, in turn, provide a foundation to better understand the recent expansion 
of Appointment Clause jurisprudence, which is discussed in Part C of this 
Section, and the effects of that expansion to IRS AOs, which is discussed in 
section four of this paper.   
                                                 
 70.  I.R.C. § 6330(c)(3)(C).  
 71.  I.R.C. § 6330(d)(1).  
 72.  See generally I.R.C. § 7430. 
 73.  I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(A)(ii), and Treas. Reg. § 301.7430-1(b). 
 74.  I.R.C. § 6213(a). 
 75.  See generally I.R.C. § 6511(a)-(b) (Taxpayers can sometimes receive no deficiency 
notice when contesting denials of claims for refund.) 
 76.  Treas. Reg. § 601.106(d)(2)(ii) (stating, in part, that “[AOs] having authority for the 
administrative determination of tax liabilities … are also authorized to prepare, sign on behalf 
of the Commissioner, and send to the taxpayer by registered or certified mail any statutory 
notice of deficiency prescribed …”). 
 77.  See I.R.C. § 6212 (A statutory notice of deficiency is sometimes referred to 
informally as a taxpayer’s “ticket to Tax Court.”). 
 78.  See, e.g., Tucker v. Comm'r, 135 T.C. 114, 166 (2010), and Tucker v. Comm’r, 676 
F.3d 1129, 1132 (2012) (considering IRS AOs not to be Officers under the U.S. Constitution). 
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A. The Scope of the Appointments Clause  
 
Simply stated, the Appointments Clause requires Officers of the United 
States to be appointed.79  This means such Officers can be hired and fired 
only as directed by Article II.80  Under Article II, principal Officers are 
appointed by the President with advice and consent of the Senate,81 and 
inferior Officers82 are appointed by the President alone, a Court, or a 
Department Head.83  In discussing the scope of the Appointments Clause, 
and how it applies to AOs, this paper focuses only on the scope and definition 
of inferior Officers.84  This is because, by definition, inferior Officers answer 
to other appointed Officers, whereas principal Officers answer only to the 
President.85  Thus, if the Appointments Clause were to apply to AOs, they 
would not be considered principal Officers because AOs answer to other 
Officers, not to the President.  Instead, if AOs were subject to the 
Appointments Clause, they would fall under the scope and definition of an 
inferior Officer (hereon referred to simply as “Officer”).86  
                                                 
 79.  U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2. 
 80.  See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 126 (1926) (“In the absence of any specific 
provision to the contrary, the power of appointment to executive office carries with it, as a 
necessary incident, the power of removal …”), and United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 
285 (1886) (stating that “Congress [has] the power to limit and regulate removal of such 
inferior officers by heads of departments when it exercises its constitutional power to lodge 
the power of appointment with them.”).  
 81.  Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 716 (1988) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (defining an 
Officer who answers directly to the President as a principle Officer). 
 82.  Id. (defining an Officer who answers to another appointed Officer as an inferior 
Officer); see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 510 
(2010) (stating “inferior [o]fficers are officers whose work is directed and supervised at some 
level by other [o]fficers …”). 
 83.  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 at 126 (1976), superseded by statue, The Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub.L. No. 107–155, 116 Stat. 81 as recognized in 
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 93 (2003); see also Freytag v. Comm’r, 
501 U.S. 868, 915 (1991) (defining a department as a “free standing, self-contained entity in 
the Executive Branch.”); see also John T. Plecnik, Officers Under the Appointments Clause, 
11. PITT. TAX. REV. 201, 203 (2014) (a department head includes the Treasury Secretary but 
not the IRS Commissioner). 
 84.  See generally Morrison, 487 U.S. at 716 (discussing the differences between inferior 
and principal Officers).  
 85.  Id.  
 86.  See Tucker, 135 T.C. at 165-66 (supporting the proposition that AOs cannot be 
considered principal Officers because AOs answer to the Chief Counsel and Assistant Chief 
Counsel of the IRS) (“[N]o CDP determination is issued until it has been reviewed and 
approved by a higher-ranking team manager.”); see also 26 U.S.C. § 6330(c)(1) (“The appeals 
officer shall at the hearing obtain verification from the Secretary that the requirements of any 
applicable law or administrative procedure have been met.”). 
3 - DYKZEUL_HBLJV17-1 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/2/20  12:47 PM 
Winter 2021 TURBULENT TIME AT TREASURY 43 
Distinguishing Officers from mere employees is an essential first step 
to applying the Appointment’s Clause because employees do not require 
appointment.87  Employees are defined as “lesser functionaries subordinate 
to [O]fficers of the United States.”88 T he Supreme Court has, over the years, 
defined certain characteristics necessary for an employee to be considered 
an Officer subject to the Appointments Clause.89  Those characteristics are 
conveniently distilled within a two-factor test.90  In other words, to be subject 
to the Appointments Clause, an Officer must maintain a “continuing office 
established by law” and, in addition, must “wield significant authority.”91 
An Officer maintains a “continuing office” when “they serve on an 
ongoing, rather than a temporary or episodic basis,” and their “duties, salary, 
and means of appointment are all specified [by law].”92  This first factor was 
examined by the Supreme Court in United States v. Germaine.93  There, the 
Supreme Court held that “civil surgeons” were mere employees because 
their duties were occasional or temporary rather than “continuing and 
permanent.”94  Importantly, the surgeons in Germaine acted only when 
called on by the Commissioner of Pensions.95  In addition, the surgeons made 
no oath for office, nor were any appropriations made to pay their 
compensation.96  Thus, the Supreme Court held that civil surgeons did not 
maintain a “continuing office” because their positions were temporary and 
they did not receive statutorily defined duties, salary or means of 
appointment.97 
As for the second factor within the two-factor test, the Appointments 
Clause requires Officers to wield “significant authority.”98  The Supreme 
Court has found “significant authority” where an Officer has the power to 
issue final decisions,99 and where an Officer has unfettered use of 
discretion.100  Importantly, an Officer will not be removed of their Officer 
                                                 
 87.  See Plecnik, supra note 83, at 203 (discussing the application of the Appointments 
Clause to federal employees). 
 88.  Buckley, 424 U.S. at 125-26. 
 89.  Id. (clarifying that Officers hold positions that “[do] not include all employees …”). 
 90.  Lucia, 138 S.Ct. at 2049 (applying most recently the two-factor Officer test to SEC 
ALJs).  
 91.  Tucker, 135 T.C. at 159. 
 92.  Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881. 
 93.  United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 512 (1878). 
 94.  Id. at 510. 
 95.  Id. at 512. 
 96.  Id.  
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Tucker, 135 T.C. at 159 (2010). 
 99.  See Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1133-34 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 100.  Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882. 
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status for occasionally performing employee duties.101  In other words, an 
Officer will not be considered an “[O]fficer for purposes of some of their 
duties… but mere employees with respect to other responsibilities.”102  
Therefore, in determining whether an employee wields the necessary 
authority to be considered an Officer subject to appointment, prior Courts 
look at all the duties assigned to the employee in question.103  
 
B. Prior Application of the Appointments Clause to Appeals Officers 
 
Because Courts apply the Appointments Clause on a case-by-case 
basis,104 it is important to understand how prior Courts have specifically 
applied the Appointments Clause to AOs.  This section provides an analysis 
of two prior Court opinions that considered AOs “mere employees” who are 
outside the scope of the Appointments Clause.  Those cases are Tucker I and 
Tucker II.105 
 
1. Tucker I 
 
The Tax Court first looked at whether AOs were Officers subject to the 
Appointments Clause in Tucker v. CIR (Tucker I).106  There, the Court held 
that AOs were not subject to appointment because, among other reasons, 
they did not wield significant authority.107  Tucker I involved a taxpayer who 
appealed an IRS notice of intent to file a lien to collect unpaid taxes.108  The 
taxpayer’s appeal was granted and a CDP hearing was held by an AO.109  The 
AO sustained the notice of intent to file a lien, from which the taxpayer 
appealed to Tax Court on constitutional grounds, arguing that the AO who 
                                                 
 101.  Id. (stating that where an “[O]fficer on occasion performs duties that may be 
performed by an employee not subject to the Appointments Clause does not transform [her] 
status under the Constitution”).  
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1132 (2012) (“[W]e look not only to the authority that Appeals 
employees wielded in [Petitioner’s] case but to all their duties …”).  See also Free Enterprise 
Fund, 561 U.S. at 520 (2010) (“[T]he Court in these circumstances has looked to function and 
context, and not to bright-line rules.”) (Breyer J., dissenting). 
 104.  Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 539 (stating “I understand the virtues of a 
common-law case-by-case approach” to applying the Appointments Clause to inferior 
Officers) (Breyer J., dissenting).  
 105.  See generally Tucker, 135 T.C. 114 (2010); Tucker, 676 F.3d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 106.  Tucker, 135 T.C. 114 (2010).  
 107.  Id. at 165.  
 108.  Id. at 116. 
 109.  Id. 
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handled his administrative appeal was required to be appointed.110  The Tax 
Court heard the appeal, applied the two-part “Officer” test, and held that an 
AO “has neither a position ‘established by [l]aw’ nor ‘significant authority’ 
that is characteristic of an ‘[O]fficer of the United States’ for purposes of the 
Appointments Clause.”111  
In examining the first factor of the two-part test, the Tax Court 
concluded that “no [AO] position [was] established by law.”112  Despite AOs 
having duties and salary specified by law, the Tax Court considered such 
specified duties, salary, and means of appointment as non-determinative for 
purposes of meeting the first factor.  Specifically, the Court stated that such 
specified duties and salary are only “a factor that has proven relevant under 
the Supreme Court’s Appointments Clause jurisprudence.”113  Instead, the 
Tax Court found that Appeals Officers did not hold offices established by 
law because the IRS Office of Appeals, within which AOs perform their 
duties, was created by an Executive order with statutory authority.114  The 
Court stated that “[i]f there were a statutory provision to the effect that 
‘[t]here shall be, within the IRS Office of Appeals, officers designated as 
Appeals Officers, who shall conduct CDP hearings,’ etc. . . then that would 
be some indication that the Appeals Officer Position was [e]stablished by 
[l]aw.”115  The Tax Court supported their conclusion by looking at the 
statutory language within I.R.C. Sections 6320 and 6330, which specify 
duties for the AO position.116  Those statutes refer specifically to AOs as 
either an “[O]fficer or employee.”  The Court concluded that, “[i]f Congress 
had intended to assign CDP duty to a particular rank of “Appeals Officer,” 
it would not have added the phrase “or employee.”117  Lastly, the Court found 
that no Appeals Office was established by Treasury Regulations,118 however 
the Court did not examine any Treasury Regulations during its analysis.119  
                                                 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. at 165. 
 112.  Id. at 152.  
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. at 153. 
 115.  Id. (“It was the Executive Branch that created the IRS Office of Appeals and its 
personnel structure, pursuant to that authority in [S]ection 7804(a).”).   
 116.  See generally I.R.C. § 6320 (2019); I.R.C § 6330 (2019). 
 117.  Tucker, 135 T.C. at 154 (2010). 
 118.  Id. at 159 (“[E]ven under the regulations the CDP responsibility does not inhere in 
any specific office or position.”).  
 119.  Id. at 158-59.  
3 - DYKZEUL_HBLJV17-1 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/2/20  12:47 PM 
46 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL Vol. 17:2 
Despite finding that the AO “positon in question [was] not an office 
established by law,”120 the Court went on to assume that the AO position was 
established by law, stating: 
 
However, if the phrase “established by [l]aw” were construed to 
mean that the Appointments Clause can apply only to a position 
expressly created by a statute, then abuses could arise.  For example, 
Congress could take a pre-existing low-level position (which had 
been created by the Executive Branch pursuant to a general 
authorization like section 7804(a), and which was not subject to 
appointment by the President or a Head of a Department) and could 
invest it with significant additional power, thus evading the 
Appointments Clause by seeming to avoid “establishing” the 
office.121 
 
The Court supported their new position by pointing to cases from the Fifth 
and Sixth Circuits, which found an Administrative Review Board (ARB) 
employee to be an Officer under the Appointments Clause despite the ARB 
being created by order of the Secretary of Labor.122  The Tax Court was 
hesitant, but went on to “assume arguendo that the CDP function prescribed 
under [S]ections 6320 and 6330 and the regulations thereunder is committed 
to a position “established by [l]aw.”123  Considering the first-factor met, the 
Court then examined the second factor of whether AOs wield “significant 
authority.”124 
In examining the second factor, the Court held that AOs do not wield 
significant authority because they do not make final decisions.125  The Court 
supported their determination by citing Landry.126  There, the Court stated in 
dicta that adjudicative positions do not have final decision making power 
where their “determinations are subject to supervision.”127  In Landry, the 
                                                 
 120.  Id. at 158 
 121.  Tucker, 135 T.C. at 158. 
 122.  Id. at 157 (referring to Willy v. Admin. Rev. Bd., 423 F.3d 483, 491 (5th Cir. 2005)), 
and Varnadore v. Sec. of Labor, 141 F.3d 625, 631 (6th Cir.1998) (finding an Administrative 
Review Board (ARB) member to be an inferior Officer under the Appointments Clause 
despite the ARB being created by order of the Secretary of Labor). 
 123.  Id. at 158-9 (“Rather, the parties and the [C]ourts seem to have assumed that if the 
positions existed, then the positions were established by law.  If this assumption is correct, 
then it would seem that any “Office” that actually existed in the Federal Government is 
arguably established by law.”). 
 124.  Id. at 160. 
 125.  Id. at 161.  
 126.  Id. (citing Landry, 204 F.3d at 1133-1134). 
 127.  Id. at 163 (citing Landry, 204 F.3d at 1133-1134). 
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DC Court of Appeals held the administrative law judges (ALJs) in 
question128 did not exercise significant authority because their decisions were 
subject to agency review and were thus not final.129  The Tax Court in Tucker 
applied the same analysis to IRS AOs and found they were not vested with 
“independent authority” because their decisions were subject to approval by 
the Office of Appeals, which “retains jurisdiction to reconsider and overturn 
its personnel’s determinations with respect to a collection action.”130 Thus, 
according to the court, because AOs do not have final decision making 
power, they do not wield significant authority.131  
 
2. Tucker II.  
 
The taxpayer in Tucker I appealed the Tax Court decision to the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals.  The Circuit Court upheld the Tax Court decision, 
finding AOs outside the purview of the Appointments Clause.132  However, 
the Circuit Court did not take a decisive position on whether AOs maintain 
continuing positions under law.  Specifically, the court stated “we first 
consider – and ultimately bypass – whether, in the words of the clause, [AO] 
positions were established by law.”133  Although, in bypassing the first 
factor, the Court stated that it would seem “anomalous if the Appointments 
Clause were inapplicable to positions extant in the bureaucratic hierarchy, 
and to which Congress assigned ‘significant authority,’ merely because 
neither Congress nor the [E]xecutive branch had formally created the 
positions.”134  The Court quickly added that, “[i]n any event, because we 
conclude below that [AOs] do not exercise significant authority within the 
meaning of the Appointments Clause cases, we need not resolve whether 
their positions were ‘established by [l]aw’ for purposes of that clause.”135  
The Court then examined the “significance” of AO authority.   
In holding that AOs do not wield significant authority, the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals looked at three criteria: the significance of the matters 
resolved by AOs, the discretion they exercise in reaching their decision, and 
the finality of those decisions.136  The Court did not quibble over the first 
                                                 
 128.  Landry, 204 F.3d at 1128 (In Landry, the ALJs in question adjudicated on behalf of 
the Federal Deposited Insurance Corporation (FDIC)).   
 129.  Id. at 1133. 
 130.  Tucker, 135 T.C. at 164 (referencing 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(2)). 
 131.  Id.  
 132.  Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1133. 
 133.  Id. at 1132. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id.  
 136.  Id. at 1133. 
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criterion.  Instead, the Court took as fact “that the issue of a person's tax 
liability is substantively significant enough to meet [the first factor], in which 
case degrees of discretion and finality will ultimately be determinative.”137  
In examining the second criterion, the court found the discretion exercised 
by AOs to be constrained because there are limitations on the settlement 
amounts on which they can agree.138  For example, “if Appeals estimates that 
the IRS’s chances of prevailing on a disputed point of law are 60%, [an AO] 
may agree to accept only 60% of the liability that turns on the point.”139 The 
court also noted that AO discretion is constrained because they are instructed 
to “[r]equest legal advice from an Associate Chief Counsel office on novel 
or significant issues.”140  Further, the Court noted that AOs must receive 
approval from Treasury’s General Counsel for any compromise exceeding 
$50,000,141 and any closing agreement relieving a taxpayer of a liability is 
subject to approval by the Treasury Secretary.142  For these reasons, the 
Tucker II Court found the discretion of an AO to be “highly constrained.”143 
Lastly, the court examined the final decision making authority of AOs.  
However, the Court avoided an in-depth analysis.  Specifically, the Court 
“conclude[d] that the [AOs] lack of discretion [was] determinative, 
offsetting the effective finality of [their] decisions …”144  The Court reasoned 
that, “if the tasks assigned [to] a position allowed the holder no choice, 
obviously, it would be pointless to classify [her] as an “Officer” even though 
the consequences of [her] ministerial decisions were both vital and final.”145  
Thus, the Court concluded that “the significance and discretion involved in 








                                                 
 137.  Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1133. 
 138.  Id. at 1134 (“[An AO] is subject to consultation requirements, to guidelines, and to 
supervision.”). 
 139.  Id. (citing C.F.R. § 601.106(f)(2)). 
 140.  Id. (citing I.R.M. pt. 8.6.3.5 (Oct. 26, 2007)). 
 141.  Id. (citing U.S.C. § 7122(b)). 
 142.  Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1134. 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. at 1135 (internal quotations omitted).  
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C. Recent Additions to the Appointments Clause Jurisprudence 
 
In 2018, the Supreme Court decided Lucia v. SEC,147 which effectively 
redefines essential features of the Appointments Clause analysis relied on by 
both the Tucker I and Tucker II Courts. (i.e., Tax Court and D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals, respectively).  In Lucia, Petitioner marketed a retirement 
savings strategy called “Buckets of Money.”148  The SEC considered 
Petitioner’s business strategy deceitful and charged Petitioner under the 
Investment Advisors Act.149  An ALJ for the SEC concluded that Petitioner 
had violated the Investment Advisors Act.150  Petitioner appealed the ALJs 
decision arguing it was invalid because the SEC’s ALJ was not 
constitutionally appointed under the Appointments Clause.151  Petitioner’s 
appeal was granted certiorari, and the Supreme Court applied the two-factor 
test to determine whether SEC ALJs are Officers under the Constitution.152  
The Supreme Court cited their opinions in Freytag and Germaine153 to 
establish the first-factor, that Officers, as defined under the Appointments 
Clause, must “hold a continuing office established by law.”154  In Freytag, 
the Supreme Court found that Special Trial Judges (STJs) of the US Tax 
Court had continuing positions because “they serve on an ongoing, rather 
than a temporary or episodic basis, and their duties, salary, and means of 
appointment are all specified in the Tax Code.”155  The Supreme Court 
compared the duties and statutory authority of SEC ALJs to the STJs in 
Freytag and found that SEC ALJs, like Tax Court STJs, receive career 
appointments to statutorily created positions, and therefore hold a 
“continuing office established by law.”156  Thus, the first factor was met.   
In examining the second-factor, the Supreme Court cited their holding 
in Freytag to establish that Officers, as defined under the Appointment 
Clause, must wield significant authority.157  In Freytag, the Supreme Court 
held that Special Trial Judges (STJs) of the US Tax Court wielded significant 
                                                 
 147.  Lucia, 138 S. Ct. 2044. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. at 2050.  
 151.  Id. at 2051.  
 152.  Id. at 2051.  
 153.  Germaine, 99 U.S. at 510.  
 154.  Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2047 (citing Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881). 
 155.  Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881.  
 156.  Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2047 (“The Commission’s ALJs, like the Tax Court’s STJs, hold 
a continuing office established by law. SEC ALJs receive a career appointment… to a position 
created by statute . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 157.  Id. at 2053 (“Freytag says everything necessary to decide this case.”).  
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authority under law.158  There, the Government attempted to equate 
“significant authority” with the authority to issue final decisions.159  
Specifically, the Government argued “that STJs are employees in all cases 
in which they could not enter a final decision.”160 The Government supported 
their argument by pointing to specific cases where STJs lacked final 
decision-making authority.161  The Freytag Court, however, disagreed with 
the Government’s position and pointed to instances where STJs could issue 
final decisions.162 Importantly, the Court stated:  
 
[STJs] are not inferior officers for purposes of some of their duties 
… but mere employees with respect to other responsibilities.  The 
fact that an inferior [O]fficer on occasion performs duties that may 
be performed by an employee not subject to the Appointments 
Clause does not transform [her] status under the Constitution.  If a 
special trial judge is an inferior [O]fficer for purposes of [some 
duties, she] is an inferior officer within the meaning of the 
Appointments Clause and must be properly appointed.163 
 
In determining that SEC ALJs wielded “significant authority,” the 
Supreme Court in Lucia compared the SEC’s ALJs to the STJs in Freytag.164 
Similar to the Tax Court’s STJs, the ALJs in Lucia could only “issue initial 
decisions containing factual findings, legal conclusions and appropriate 
remedies.”165 These initial decisions were reviewable and potentially 
dismissible by the SEC, but if the SEC opted against review, it would issue 
                                                 
 158.  Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882. 
 159.  Id. at 881 (“The Commissioner reasons that special trial judges may be deemed 
employees in subsection (b)(4) cases because they lack authority to enter a final decision.”). 
 160.  Id. at 881-82; see also, Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2048 (holding SEC ALJs to wield 
significant authority where the SEC had the power to adopt the ALJs opinion as final or ignore 
it entirely). 
 161.  Id. at 874 (“Petitioners appear not to appreciate the distinction between the [STJ’s] 
authority to hear cases and prepare proposed findings and opinions under subsection (b)(4) 
and their lack of authority actually to decide those cases, which is reserved exclusively for 
judges of the Tax Court.”). 
 162.  Id. at 873. 
 163.  Id. at 882.  
 164.  Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2047–48 (“Freytag’s analysis decides this case. The 
Commission's ALJs, like the Tax Court's STJs, hold a continuing office established by law … 
and they exercise the same “significant discretion” when carrying out the same “important 
functions” as STJs do.”). 
 165.  Id. at 2048 (“SEC ALJs issue decisions much like that in Freytag. STJs prepare 
proposed findings and an opinion adjudicating charges and assessing tax liabilities.”). 
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an order making the initial decision final.166 In comparing SEC ALJs to Tax 
Court STJs, the Lucia Court stated: 
 
[a] regular Tax Court judge must always review a STJ's opinion.  
And that opinion counts for nothing unless the regular judge adopts 
it as his own.  By contrast, the SEC can decide against reviewing an 
ALJ decision at all.  And when the SEC declines review (and issues 
an order saying so), the ALJ's decision itself ‘becomes final’ and is 
deemed the action of the Commission.167  
 
As stated by the Lucia Court, “that last word capacity makes this an a 
fortiori case: If the Tax Court’s STJs are [O]fficers, as Freytag held, then the 
Commission’s ALJs must be too.”168 
In addition to determining that SEC ALJs have final-decision making 
authority, the ALJs were also found “to exercise the same ‘significant 
discretion’ when carrying out the same ‘important functions’ as [the Tax 
Court’s] STJs.”  The Lucia Court examined specific duties assigned to the 
ALJs, which included the administration of hearings,169 and the issuance of 
decisions setting out “findings and conclusions about all material issues of 
fact and law …  includ[ing] the appropriate order, sanction, relief, or denial 
thereof.”170  The Court considered these important functions to be “much like 
that in Freytag—except with potentially more independent effect. As the 
Freytag Court recounted, STJs ‘prepare prosed findings and an opinion’ 
adjudicating charges and assessing tax liabilities. Similarly, the 
Commissions ALJs issue decisions containing factual findings, legal 
conclusions, and appropriate remedies.”171  In the Courts eyes, these 
important functions were “sufficient to make someone an [O]fficer of the 
United States.”172 
 
                                                 
 166.  Id. at 2046 (“The Commission can review that decision, but if it opts against review, 
it issues an order that the initial decision has become final.”).  
 167.  Id. at 2053-54. 
 168.  Id. at 2054, 2067 (“[A] prerequisite to officer status is the authority, in at least some 
instances, to issue final decisions that bind the Government or third parties.”) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting). 
 169.  Id. at 2049 (Hearings include “supervising discovery; issuing, revoking, or 
modifying subpoenas; deciding motions; ruling on the admissibility of evidence; 
administering oaths; hearing and examining witnesses; generally regulating the course of the 
proceeding and the conduct of the parties and their counsel; and imposing sanctions for 
contemptuous conduct or violations of procedural requirements.”).  
 170.  Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2049. 
 171.  Id. at 2053.  
 172.  Id. at 2056.  
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IV.THE APPLICATION OF THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE TO 
AOS AFTER LUCIA 
 
This section applies to AOs the two-part test used by the Courts in 
Tucker I and Tucker II, but further incorporates the additional analysis 
provided by the Supreme Court in Lucia.  The Lucia Court considered SEC 
ALJs to be Officers despite their opinions being subject to oversight and 
potential dismissal by higher ranking Officers, a quality that the Courts in 
Tucker I and Tucker II found fatal to an Officer status determination under 
the Appointments Clause.  This section, therefore, explores how the holding 
and analysis in Lucia differs from the reasoning employed by the Courts in 
Tucker I and Tucker II, and further explains how the Lucia Court’s 
application of the Appointments Clause to SEC ALJs affects IRS AOs.  
 
A. The Changes Brought by the Lucia Decision to Appointments 
Clause Jurisprudence  
 
The Lucia Court’s holding effectively modifies the analysis employed 
by the Courts in Tucker I and Tucker II to determine Officer status under the 
Appointments Clause.  In determining the presence of significant authority, 
the Lucia Court found SEC ALJs to have final-decision making powers 
despite their determinations being subject to review and potential dismissal 
by the SEC Commissioner.173  As clarified by the Lucia Court, anytime the 
Commissioner forgoes review, “the ALJ's decision itself ‘becomes final’ and 
is deemed the action of the Commission.”174  The Court found this “last word 
capacity” to be a deciding factor in determining the Officer status of the 
ALJs.175 This analysis, however, stands in stark contrast to the analysis 
employed by the Courts in Tucker I and Tucker II. 
In Tucker I, the Tax Court considered AOs “mere employees” because 
their “determinations [were] subject to supervision,” and thus, according to 
the Court, they lacked final-decision making capacity.176  The holding and 
rationale employed by the Lucia Court, however, effectively rejects this 
position.  The Lucia opinion stands for the proposition that supervision or 
review of a federal actor, in some instances, is not enough to merit employee 
status if, in other instances, the federal actor has independent authority to 
issue final decisions that bind the government.177  The Lucia Court used the 
                                                 
 173.  Id. at 2051. 
 174.  Id. at 2054.  
 175.  Id.  
 176.  Tucker, 135 T.C. at 163 (citing Landry, 204 F.3d at 1133-34 (2000)). 
 177.  See Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2067. 
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analysis in Freytag to buttress their conclusion that an Officer will not lose 
their “Officer status” in situations where they take-on employee functions.178  
That is, SEC ALJs are not employees because their opinions can be reviewed 
and dismissed by the Commissioner, they are instead Officers because their 
opinions can become final if the Commissioner opts against such review.  
The Court in Tucker I failed to give credence to the authority of an AO to 
issue final decisions in certain cases.  Instead, the Court equated supervision 
and oversight with an inability to issue final decisions.  That is, Tucker II 
held that AOs were employees because their decisions were subject to review 
and dismissal by the IRS Commissioner.179  That holding contradicts the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Lucia, which made clear that supervision and 
oversight does not strip away Officer status if there are instances where the 
federal actor has the authority to issue final decisions that bind the 
Government.180  Thus, the analysis employed by Tucker I is no longer good 
law after the Supreme Court’s holding in Lucia.  
The Lucia holding and rational also frustrate the analysis employed by 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Tucker II.  There, the Court considered 
AO discretion to be constrained because AOs are “subject to consultation 
requirements, to guidelines, and to supervision.”181 For example, the Court 
noted that AOs must seek advice for novel issues182 and must receive 
approval prior to compromising liabilities above certain amounts.183  
However, such constraints are closely reminiscent of the oversight and 
supervision discussed in Freytag and Lucia.  For example, the STJs in 
Freytag had similar constraints in that their proposed opinions were “subject 
to review and final decision by a Tax Court judge, regardless of the amount 
in issue.”184  Similarly, in Lucia, the determinations made by SEC ALJs were 
also subject to review, wherein the Commissioner could “make any findings 
or conclusion that in [her] judgement are proper and on the basis of the 
record.”185  Despite similar constraints, the Tucker II opinion differed from 
                                                 
 178.  Id. at n.4 (“And we thought it made no sense to classify the STJs as [O]fficers for 
some cases and employees for others.”). 
 179.  Tucker, 135 T.C. at 143-144 (“The IRS [] may re-think the [AO’s] collection 
decisions and may take a position—in the litigation or in the settlement of it—that is different 
from the position reflected in the Office of Appeals’ CDP determination.”). 
 180.  Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2065-66 (“Confirming that final decision making authority is a 
prerequisite to officer status would go a long way to aiding Congress and the Executive 
Branch in sorting out who is an officer and who is a mere employee.”) (Sotomayor J., 
dissenting). 
 181.  Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1134.  
 182.  I.R.M. § 8.6.3.5.  
 183.  I.R.C. § 7122(b).  
 184.  Freytag, 501 U.S. at 874. 
 185.  Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2066. 
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the Supreme Court opinion in Lucia and Freytag, in part, because the Court 
in Tucker II failed to consider instances where AOs exercise unfettered 
discretion.  That is, the Tucker II Court ignored an AO’s authority to exercise 
complete discretion to bind the IRS in specific cases.  The Lucia Court makes 
clear that consideration of such discretion and authority is necessary to 
determine Officer status under the Appointments Clause.   
The Lucia Court clarified “that a perquisite to Officer status is the 
authority, in at least some instances, to issue final decisions that bind the 
Government or third parties.”186  This prerequisite, employed with the 
reasoning set forth by the Supreme Court in Freytag, pushes against the 
Tucker II analysis which focused almost entirely on the constrained 
discretion of an AO.  Specifically, the Freytag Court made clear that a 
federal actor, who is an Officer for the purpose of some duties, will not lose 
their Officer status by performing employee-like functions in other 
instances.187  The Lucia Court further adds that an Officer who has unfettered 
discretion and authority, in at least some instances, will not lose their Officer 
status in other instances where their discretion and authority is 
constrained.188  In other words, Lucia makes clear that any determination of 
Officer status requires Courts to look at the discretion and authority of the 
federal actor in all instances.  The Court’s analysis in Tucker II diverges 
from Lucia because, in examining the discretion of an AO, Tucker II severed 
away Officer-like duties from employee-like functions.  In doing so, the 
Court rested its opinion upon the examination of employee functions alone.  
Such pointed analysis falls short of what is required under Lucia.  
 
B. Applying the Appointments Clause to AOs After Lucia  
 
As a preliminary matter, prior to applying the Lucia analysis to AOs, 
some may argue that the ALJs in Lucia are entirely different from AOs such 
that any comparison of the federal actors is without merit.  For example, the 
ALJs in Lucia, as well as the STJs in Freytag, held positions that conducted 
formal adversarial hearings, which are unlike the informal CDP hearings 
conducted by AOs.189  There is, however, no common-law basis to support 
                                                 
 186.  Id. at 2046, 2054, 2066 (clarifying that officers must, in some instances, have 
authority to issue final decisions). 
 187.  Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882 (stating that Officers will not be considered employees for 
some of their duties yet Officers for other duties).  
 188.  Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2046 (clarifying that the prospect of review is not enough to 
strip an Officer of their Officer status). 
 189.  See Treas. Reg. § 601.106(c) (clarifying the informal nature of CDP hearings in that 
no testimony is taken under oath). 
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such a position.  To the contrary, even the Court in Tucker II stated that “we 
do not understand Freytag to suggest that mere informality of proceedings, 
or the absence of adversarial procedures, could justify denying ‘Officer’ 
status to one whose powers would otherwise demand that classification.”190  
It would therefore seem that Lucia is not distinguishable based on the 
differences between IRS and SEC appeal procedures.  
In determining the Officer status of an IRS AO, Lucia requires Courts 
to examine instances where AOs exercise significant authority and discretion 
to issue final decisions on behalf of the IRS.191  If instances of significant 
authority and discretion are present, AOs will not be considered employees 
just because there are other instances where their authority is limited or 
constrained.192  Instead, under Freytag, Courts must confirm AOs as Officers 
under the Appointments Clause where, as clarified by Lucia, there exists 
instances of significant authority. 
In examining instances of significant authority, AOs are delegated 
broad discretionary powers to issue final decisions on behalf of the IRS.  In 
this vein, there are three such instances.  First, AOs are granted complete 
“authority to represent the regional commissioner in his/her authority to 
settle all cases docketed in the Tax Court and designated for trial at any place 
within the territory compromising the region.”193  Second, AOs “may 
represent the regional commissioner in his/her exclusive and final authority 
for the determination of … tax liability [and] liability for additions to the tax, 
additional amounts, and assessable penalties provided under Chapter 68 of 
the Code.”194  Third, “[AOs] of the Appeals office having authority for the 
administrative determination of tax liabilities … are also authorized to 
prepare, sign on behalf of the Commissioner, and send to the taxpayer by 
registered or certified mail any statutory notice of deficiency prescribed.”195  
An IRS AO thus has exclusive and final authority to act on behalf of 
regional commissioners and the IRS Commissioner himself.  Even where 
constraints are present, in some instances, an AO still has the discretion and 
authority to issue final decisions.  For example, AOs have broad discretion 
in settling tax liability.  That is, an AO’s determination to settle liability 
                                                 
 190.  Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1135.  
 191.  Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2046, 2054, 2066 (clarifying that officers must, in some 
instances, have authority to issue final decisions). 
 192.  Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882 (stating that Officers will not be considered employees for 
some of their duties yet Officers for other duties). 
 193.  Treas. Reg. § 601.106(a)(1)(i); see also I.R.M. § 1.2.47.5 (clarifying that regional 
commissioners receive appointment and authority delegated by the IRS Commissioner, who 
is a principal Officer appointed by the President with Senate consent). 
 194.  Treas. Reg. § 601.106(a)(1)(ii)(c) (emphasis added). 
 195.  Id. § 601.106(d)(ii). 
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considers all relevant issues raised by the taxpayer196 and weighs whether the 
collection action “balances the need for the efficient collection of taxes with 
the legitimate concern of the person that any collection action be no more 
intrusive than necessary.”197  Importantly, this determination includes 
findings and conclusions about material issues of facts and law.  Before any 
final determination is made, the AO must “obtain verification from the 
Secretary that the requirements of any applicable law or administrative 
procedure have been met.”198  Once verification is received, the AOs 
decision itself becomes final and is deemed the action of the IRS.199 
The holding in Lucia requires AOs to be considered Officers under the 
Appointments Clause.  In Lucia, the Supreme Court recognized the 
constraints placed on SEC ALJs. Specifically, the Court noted that ALJ 
opinions were subject to review and potential dismissal by the SEC 
Commissioner.200  Despite the presence of this review, according to the Lucia 
Court, once the ALJ’s opinion is approved, “the ALJ’s decision itself 
‘becomes final’ and is deemed the action of the Commission.”201  The SEC’s 
review over its ALJ opinions is similar to the IRS’s review over its AO 
determinations.  The Treasury Secretary must also review and approve AO 
settlement decisions, and once approved, the AO’s decision itself becomes 
final and is deemed the action of the IRS.  In these instances, AOs are 
afforded the discretion and authority to bind the government and third 
parties.202  Thus, AOs wield the significant authority necessary for Officer 
status under the Appointments Clause, and are therefore required to be 
appointed as held by the Supreme Court in Lucia.  
It can, however, be argued that Lucia does not change the outcome of 
Tucker I and Tucker II because AOs will not meet the first factor of the two-
factor test for Officer status.  That is, even if there are instances where AOs 
wield significant authority, their position is not part of an Office established 
                                                 
 196.  I.R.C. § 6330(c)(1)-(2)(A). 
 197.  Id. § 6330(c)(3)(C). 
 198.  Id. § 6330(c)(1). 
 199.  Once adopted by the IRS, AO settlement decisions become final and binding; see 
I.R.C. § 7122(c) (verifying that offers in compromise are binding on the IRS); see also I.R.S. 
PUB. NO. 556 (clarifying that to receive attorney fees, the taxpayer must “apply for 
administrative costs within 90 days of the date on which the final decision of the IRS Office 
of Appeals … was mailed to you.”) (emphasis added). 
 200.  Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2046 (By contrast, the SEC can decide against reviewing an ALJ 
decision at all.  And when the SEC declines review (and issues an order saying so), the ALJ’s 
decision itself becomes final and is deemed the action of the Commission). 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  See generally I.R.C. § 7122; see also Treas. Reg. § 301.7122-1 (clarifying that AOs 
may compromise cases on behalf of the Treasury Secretary and that compromises are binding 
on the IRS and third-parties). 
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by law.  After all, the Office of Appeals was established by the IRS 
Commissioner, not by Congress.203  However, this argument fails on three 
counts and potentially a fourth count.  First, even if the Office of Appeals 
was created through Executive action under statutory authority, there now 
exists direct statutory authority for the AO position within the RRA passed 
in 1998.204 The statutes therein describe in detail the functions, duties and 
scope of authority delegated to AOs.205  Second, as noted by the Court in 
Tucker I, prior Courts from the Fifth and Sixth Circuits have considered 
positions to be “established by law” where the positions were actually within 
an office established by an Executive act under statutory authority.206  Such 
precedent applies directly to AOs because they work within the Office of 
Appeals, which was established by Executive action under statutory 
authority.207  Third, abuse could arise if Officer status is precluded simply 
because there is no statutory authority for the position to which the Officer 
holds.  As stated by the Court in Tucker II, “it would seem anomalous if the 
Appointments Clause were inapplicable to positions … to which Congress 
assigned ‘significant authority’ merely because neither Congress nor the 
[E]xecutive branch had formally created the position.”208  This would 
effectively allow Congress to slowly invest a position with significant 
authority while evading appointment requirement, which is a scenario the 
Appointment Clause is designed to prevent.209  Lastly, if the prior three 
responses were to fail, the Taxpayer First Act, which is a proposed Bill, has 
the potential to amend I.R.C. Sections 7803 and 7804.210  Among other 
changes, the proposed amendments formally establish an “Independent 
                                                 
 203.  Tucker, 135 T.C. at 135 (“Pursuant to [the] congressional mandate [in § 7804], the 
Commissioner established the Office of Appeals and employed personnel to staff that 
Office.”). 
 204.  See generally I.R.C. §§ 6330, 6320. 
 205.  Willy, 423 F.3d at 491-92 (5th Cir. 2005); Varnadore, 141 F.3d at 631 (6th Cir.1998) 
(finding an Administrative Review Board (ARB) member to be an inferior Officer under the 
Appointments Clause despite the ARB being created by order of the Secretary of Labor). 
 206.  Tucker, 135 T.C. at 157 (referring to Willy, 423 F.3d at 491; Varnadore, 141 F.3d at 
631 (6th Cir.1998) (finding an Administrative Review Board (ARB) member to be an inferior 
Officer under the Appointments Clause despite the ARB being created by order of the 
Secretary of Labor)). 
 207.  Tucker, 135 T.C. at 158 (referring to the general power of delegation to the 
Commissioner under I.R.C. § 7804(a)).  
 208.  Tucker, 676 F.3d at 1133.  
 209.  Tucker, 135 T.C. at 158  (“For example, Congress could take a pre-existing low-
level position (which had been created by the Executive Branch pursuant to a general 
authorization like section 7804(a), and which was not subject to appointment by the President 
or a Head of a Department) and could invest it with significant additional power, thus evading 
the Appointments Clause by seeming to avoid “establishing” the office.”). 
 210.  Taxpayer First Act, H.R. 5444, 115th Cong. (as passed by House, Apr. 18, 2018). 
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Office of Appeals” within the IRS.211  Thus, if passed by the Senate, the 
Taxpayer First Act will extinguish any remaining argument that AOs do not 
hold positions within an office established by law. 
 
V. POLICY REASONS FOR APPLYING THE APPOINTMENTS 
CLAUSE TO AOS 
 
In addition to legal precedent supporting the conclusion that AOs are 
subject to the Appointments Clause, there are also policy arguments 
supporting this conclusion as well.  First, as described in the introduction, 
applying the Appointments Clause to AOs will mitigate appearances of 
impropriety found in their close relationship with the IRS.   After all, the IRS 
is a party, either directly or indirectly, to the CDP hearings conducted by 
their AOs.212  Because AOs are hired and fired by the IRS, issues of 
impropriety arise.213  That is, the IRS’s power to hire and fire AOs “creates 
obvious incentives for [Officers] to favor agency positions.”214  Indeed, such 
“[r]emoval authority has always been associated with control: It is the sine 
qua non of effective supervision—the guarantee that subordinates will take 
direction.”215  Subjecting AOs to appointment will increase appearances of 
impartiality “[b]ecause the agency is no longer choosing the judge in its own 
cause.”216  Further, by placing removal powers outside the IRS’s control, 
“those appearing before [AOs] will feel more confident that the [IRS] is not 
directing the actions of a marionette [adjudicator].”217 
                                                 
 211.  Id. at Sec. 11101 (adding subsection (e)(1) to I.R.C. § 7803 to formally codify an 
“Independent Office of Appeals” within the IRS).  
 212.  The Most Serious Problems Encountered by Taxpayers, IRS Pub. No. 2104, Vol. 1, 
WL 9324360, at 139 (2017) (“Revenue Procedure 2012-18 provides Appeals with the 
discretion to override Counsel. In reality, however, [AOs] may well be reluctant to do so when 
Counsel actually has a seat at the table. An [AO] may lack the personal confidence or the 
institutional support necessary to stand firm in exercising independent judgement in the face 
of opposition . . .”); see also I.R.C. § 7122(c) (showing that AO’s decision to compromise 
liability is still binding onto the IRS even where counsel is not present). 
 213.  Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
206, § 1203(a), 112 Stat. 685, 720-721 (1998) (Under the RRA, the Commissioner can only 
remove AOs for good cause after a finding of misconduct). 
 214.  ALJ Quandary, supra note 4, at 801 (Author speaking to appointment of ALJs, but 
also applicable to appointment and removal of Appeals Officers). 
 215.  Ross E. Wiener, Inter-Branch Appointments After the Independent Counsel: Court 
Appointment of United States Attorneys, 86 MINN. L. REV. 363, 421 (2001) (citing Bowsher 
v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986)). 
 216.  ALJ Quandary supra note 4, at 847-48 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 217.  Id. at 848 (discussing the benefits of interbranch-appointment).  
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Second, Appeals Officers should be subject to the Appointments Clause 
because taxpayers have a statutory due process right to appeal disputes to an 
independent Office of Appeal.  That due process right is mandated under the 
Taxpayer’s Bill of Rights, in I.R.C. Section 7803, which grants taxpayers a 
“right to appeal a decision of the IRS in an independent forum.”218  Congress 
reiterated the right to an independent Appeals Office under the RRA Section 
1003, which directs the Treasury Secretary to “ensure an independent 
appeals function” within the IRS.”219  However, the existing structure 
allowing AOs to be removed by the IRS in no way fosters independence.  
This concern has long been expressed by other appointed Officers, including 
an IRS Commissioner who stated that “it would never be possible to give to 
the taxpayer the fair and independent review to which [she is rightly entitled] 
as long as the [trier of fact] is directly under, and its recommendations subject 
to the approval of, the officer whose duty it is to administer the law and 
collect the tax.”220  Subjecting AOs to appointment effectively increases the 
independence of their decisions, and thus increases the general independence 
of the IRS Appeals Office at large.  
Third, as a matter of principle, Congress is prohibited from creating an 
employee position and then, throughout time, slowly assigning that position 
significant authority.  Such a scenario poses a great threat to Executive 
powers and political accountability. “Abuse could arise.  For example, 
Congress could take a pre-existing low-level position (which had been 
created by the Executive branch pursuant to a general authorization like 
§7804(a)),221 and which was not subject to the [Appointments Clause] and 
could invest it with significant additional power, thus evading the 
Appointments Clause [altogether].”222  This scenario represents the current 
state of affairs with AOs, who have maintained employee status since their 
creation in the late 1920’s.223  Throughout time, their power has grown 
significantly.  Most notably in 1998, with the passage of the RRA, which 
invested AOs with authority to oversee statutorily mandated CDP 
                                                 
 218.  I.R.C. § 7803(a)(3)(E).  
 219.  Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 1103, 112 Stat. 685, 
720-721 (1998).  
 220.  See Dubroff & Hellwig, supra note 11, at 47 (referring to 65 CONG. REC. 2614, at 
2684 (1924) (Committee members “are the party in interest; they are plaintiff and the 
prosecutor; they are the court and jury”) (remarks of Mr. Young)). 
 221.  I.R.C § 7804(a) (clarifying that the Treasury Secretary delegated limited 
appointment powers to the IRS Commissioner under).   
 222.  See Tucker, 135 T.C. at 158. 
 223.  Strekla & Morrison, supra note 24, at 28. 
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hearings,224 to accept or reject offers in compromise,225 and to issue final 
determinations of deficiencies on behalf of the IRS Commissioner.226  
Subjecting AOs to appointment effectively prevents Congress from 
delegating significant authority to employees without the formal vetting 
procedures that are inherent to the Appointments Clause process.227 T hus, it 
is imperative that AOs are subject to appointment. 
Despite the policy reasons above, it can be argued that the appointments 
process is cumbersome and inefficient.  In addition, it can also be argued that 
appointing IRS AOs would do little to remedy issues of impropriety because 
the Executive branch would continue to choose the very candidates that fill 
its adjudicative positions.  However, such arguments hold little weight.  First, 
the appointments process is notoriously considered smooth and 
unburdensome.  In fact, even those who criticize its overuse admit the 
appointments process is effectively automatic.228  Moreover, as discussed 
below, the appointments process does not necessarily need to be placed in 
the hands of the Executive.  In fact, where IRS AOs are concerned, the 
appointments process can most viably be placed in the hands of the Courts.  
Doing so will effectively extinguish any issues of impropriety that could 
arise with Executive appointments. 
 
VI. METHODS FOR APPOINTING IRS AOS 
 
As mentioned prior, inferior Officers can be appointed by the President 
alone, the Courts, or by Department Heads.229  These methods of 
appointment are best examined in two baskets: Executive appointments, 
which includes appointment by the President and Department Heads, and 
Judiciary appointments, which are accomplished through the Courts.  The 
pros and cons of these two baskets are discussed in turn.  However, in the 
case of IRS AOs, appointment by the Judiciary appears most viable for 
reasons of impartiality and efficiency.  
                                                 
 224.  I.R.C § 6320(b)(1). 
 225.  I.R.C.  §7122(e)(2). 
 226.  Treas. Reg. § 601.106(d)(ii) (“Officers of the Appeals officer having authority for 
the administrative determination of tax liabilities referred to in paragraph (a) of this section 
are also authorized to prepare, sign on behalf of the Commissioner, and send to the taxpayer… 
any statutory notice of deficiency”).  
 227.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton). (claiming that the Appointments 
Clause effectively discourages undue influence and allows for higher quality officers). 
 228.  See Plecnik, supra note 83, at 239 (claiming where the appointments process is 
triggered, “[t]he President, Courts of Law, and Heads of Departments will happily fire up 
their autopens and appoint every single position in the federal government.”).  
 229.  U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2. 
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A. Appointment of AOs by the Executive Branch 
 
Appointment by the Executive branch means that AOs would be 
appointed by either the President or a Department Head—here, the Treasury 
Secretary who is a principal Officer and is thus also appointed by the 
President.230  As a preliminary matter, the power to remove is incident to the 
power to appoint.231  Therefore, if AOs were not appointed by the Executive 
branch,232 but were instead appointed by the Judiciary, the Executive would 
lose its removal powers.233  The importance of Executive removal powers is 
found under the “Take Care Clause” of the U.S. Constitution,234 which 
ensures that “[t]he President should be able to oversee all people who 
implement executive policy because doing so is necessary for the President 
to take care that the law is faithfully executed.”235  By “limiting the 
appointment power” to the President and his own principal appointees, the 
framers sought to “ensure that those who wielded [the appointment power] 
were accountable to political force and the will of the people.”236   
However, allowing AOs to be appointed by the Executive branch 
triggers two major issues.  First, the Executive branch would still be able “to 
choose the judge in its own cause.”237 That is, the Executive branch could 
simply appoint a candidate “whom it believes will be most sympathetic to 
agency positions.”238  The effective outcome would change little from the 
                                                 
 230.  See Tucker, 135 T.C. at 121(“(T)here is, so to speak, only one degree of separation 
between any duly appointed officer and the President himself.”). 
 231.  See Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3161; see also Burnap, 252. U.S. at 515 
(“The power to remove is, in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, an incident of 
the power to appoint.”). 
 232.  This paper has consistently compared AOs to SEC ALJs. Currently, agency ALJs 
are selected by the agency within which they work.  See 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (granting federal 
agencies the power to select ALJs as are necessary for the agency to conduct adjudicatory 
proceedings.). 
 233.  See Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 668-69 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (discussing the limited 
constraints allowed to be placed on Presidential removal powers). 
 234.  U.S. Const. art. II § 3. 
 235.  See Tucker, 135 T.C. at 121; see also ALJ Quandary, supra note 4, at 815, 834 
(discussing interbranch appointments for ALJs, the author states that “[a]gencies, among 
others, could request that the [Court] discipline or remove an ALJ for inefficiency, neglect of 
duty, or malfeasance.”). 
 236.  Id. (citing Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. at 884). 
 237.  ALJ Quandary, supra note 4, at 847 (citing Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 
U.S. 868, 886 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 238.  See ALJ Quandary, supra note 4, at 818 (discussing implications of 5 U.S.C. § 3105 
(granting agencies powers to select their ALJs); see also Free Enterprise Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 
3180–81 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“My research reflects that the Federal Government 
relies on 1,584 ALJs to adjudicate administrative matters in over 25 agencies.”). 
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current scheme wherein AOs are hired by the IRS.  Thus, as long as the 
vetting process to select and appoint AO candidates is conducted by the 
Executive branch, there stands potential for the appointment process to result 
in a pool of AOs that are partial to IRS agendas.  This outcome pushes further 
against progressive policy goals seeking to ensure an “independent” appeals 
process within the IRS.239 
Second, similar issues arise so long as the Executive branch continues 
to exercise its power to remove AOs because removal powers have long been 
associated with influence and control.240  Indeed, even Congress has long 
been weary of Executive powers to remove adjudicators, which is why tenure 
protections have become increasingly popular.241  Thus, taking removal 
powers away from the IRS and moving it up the “executive chain” does little 
to displace such mechanisms of influence.242  After all, the IRS is within the 
Treasury Department, and the Treasury Department is part of the Executive 
branch at large.  By keeping appointments of AOs within the same political 
branch, the Appointments Clause is less able to fulfill its designed purpose 
to ensure that agency adjudicators remain separate, and thus independent, 
from the agencies to which they must sometimes rule against.243  Therefore, 
to fully ensure AO independence, it is best to place appointment powers 
outside the Executive branch. 
 
B. Appointment of AOs by the Courts 
 
Judicial appointment and removal will mitigate concerns of AO 
impartiality because the Executive branch will no longer “choose the judge 
in its own cause.”244  However, despite Judicial appointment and removal 
(hereafter “interbranch appointment”) being a viable means to reduce agency 
influence over its adjudicators, interbranch appointments are highly 
contested.  For example, the Supreme Court in Morrison clarified that 
Congress’ authority to prescribe to the Judiciary the power to appoint 
                                                 
 239.  See Taxpayer First Act, H.R. 5444, 115th Cong. (2018). 
 240.  Wiener, supra note 215.   
 241.  ALJ Quandary, supra note 4, at 800 (discussing tenure as congressional means to 
limit Executive removal); see also, Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1958) 
(upheld limitations on Executive removal of agency adjudicators as means to render them 
“entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct or indirect.”). 
 242.  RRA, supra note 48, at §1203(a) (clarifying that the Commissioner of the IRS may 
terminate IRS employees “for cause on charges of misconduct.”).   
 243.  ALJ Quandary, supra note 4, at 809 (considering issues of ALJ subordination and 
the separation-of-powers doctrine).  
 244.  Id. at 847-848 (quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. 556 U.S. 868, 886 
(2009).) 
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Executive officials is not unlimited.245  Indeed, the power for Congress to 
prescribe interbranch-appointment is limited by the “principal of 
incongruity.”246  Although there is much debate as to when interbranch-
appointments are “incongruous,”247 there is general agreeance that Courts 
can appoint inferior Officers if such appointment does not impede the Courts 
central function under the Constitution, and similarly does not impede the 
Executive branch’s functioning in the same manner under the 
Constitution.248 
As a preliminary matter, Article II allows Congress to delegate to the 
Courts the power to appoint inferior Officers.249  Moreover, such power is 
often delegated, especially for the purposes of ensuring adjudicator 
independence.250  In considering ALJ appointments, for example, it has been 
argued that “granting the D.C. Circuit power to appoint adjudicators 
generally, by itself, almost certainly does not impede the central functioning 
of the judicial branch—that is, to decide disputes.”251  Support for such an 
argument points to the knowledge, expertise, and time available to the Court 
that is delegated the appointment power.252  For example, in terms of 
knowledge, the D.C. Circuit is “considered the most influential court on 
matters of administrative law, including ALJ’s decisions.”253  The D.C. 
Circuit Court also has sufficient time because it maintains the lightest 
caseload of all the Circuit Courts.254  It would therefore seem the D.C. Circuit 
Court is also a viable means to appoint IRS AOs. 
                                                 
 245.  Morrison, 487 U.S. at 675 (1998) (“We do not mean to say that Congress’ power to 
provide for interbranch appointments of ‘inferior [O]fficers’ is unlimited.”). 
 246.  Id. at 675-76 (“In addition to separation of power concerns … Congress’ decision 
to vest the appointment power in the courts would be improper if there was some ‘incongruity’ 
between the functions normally performed by the courts and the performance of their duty to 
appoint.”). 
 247.  ALJ Quandary, supra note 4, at 802 (“... [I]nterbranch appointment[s are] 
appropriate when (1) Congress has a significant justification for turning to its interbranch-
appointment power, (2) the power to appoint (and an incidental power to remove) does not 
impede the appointing branch’s central functioning under the U.S. Constitution, and (3) the 
lack of appointment (and removal) power does not, likewise, impede the competing branch’s 
central functioning.”). 
 248.  Id. 
 249.  See U.S. Const. art. I., § 2. 
 250.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 152, 631 (2006) (authorizing court appointment of bankruptcy and 
magistrate judges, respectively). 
 251.  ALJ Quandary, supra note 4, at 850.  
 252.  Id. at 832. 
 253.  Id.  
 254.  The D.C. Circuit decided the least cases per active judge in comparison to all other 
circuit courts. See Federal Court Management Statistics December 2014: Courts of Appeals, 
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However, one could argue the Circuit Court lacks the technical 
knowledge necessary to appoint Officers with such tax and audit-specific 
duties.  The functions of the IRS would be impeded because the D.C. Circuit 
Court is unable to properly assess AO candidates of their own technical 
knowledge.  In addressing this argument, an alternative Court to the D.C. 
Circuit Court could be the U.S. Tax Court.  The Supreme Court in Freytag 
considered the Tax Court a “Court of [l]aw” under the Appointments Clause, 
and thereafter granted the Tax Court appointment authority over its STJs.255 
The Tax Court certainly possesses the knowledge and experience necessary 
to assess AOs of their own technical knowledge.  Additionally, there is little 
concern of impartiality by the Tax Court reviewing the opinions written by 
the AOs it directly appointed.  This is because judges often decide cases “in 
which they have selected, for instance, defense counsel for the indigent, 
bankruptcy judges, magistrates, and special masters (all of whom could be 
the judges former law clerks) without impugning their impartiality.”256  
In either instance, whether AOs are appointed by the D.C. Circuit Court or 
the U.S. Tax Court, the Executive branch’s central functioning will not be 
impeded.  If the removal of an AO is merited, the IRS will traverse the same 
removal procedures it currently has in place, except it will traverse those 
procedures before an external authority. Specifically, the IRS can currently 
remove its employees with cause.257 The same “for cause” requirements are 
present in “external” removal proceedings.258 The only difference is that the 
IRS will need to persuade an independent entity to remove the AO.259  Such 
persuasion entails the same showing of “good cause” that is currently in 
place.260 Therefore, by subjecting AOs to interbranch appointment, the IRS 
will experience little if any impediment to its central function—to enforce 
U.S. tax law with “integrity and fairness to all.”261 
 
 
                                                 
U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/na/federal-court-managemen 
t-statist ics/2014/12/31 (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). 
 255.  Freytag, 501 U.S. at 913 (1991).  
 256.  ALJ Quandary, supra note 4, at 854; see also, United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19 
(1st Cir. 2000) (discussing judge-appointed defense counsel and prosecutors). 
 257.  RRA, supra note 48, at §1203(a). 
 258.  See Ramspeck v. Fed. Trial Exam’rs Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 132 (1953) 
(“Examiners shall be removable by the agency in which they are employed only for good 
cause established and determined by the Civil Service Commission after opportunity for 
hearing and upon the record thereof.”) (internal parentheses omitted).  
 259.  ALJ Quandary, supra note 4, at 856 (discussing interbranch removal, stating “the 
agency must continue to persuade an independent entity to remove an ALJ.”).  
 260.  RRA, supra note 48, at §1203(a). 
 261.  IRS Mission Statement and Statutory Authority, https://www.irs.gov/about-irs/the-
agency-its-mission-and-statutory-authority (last visited Apr. 16, 2019). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The fairness and independence of the IRS Appeals process is 
jeopardized so long as the IRS possesses the authority to hire and fire its AOs 
who were created to be independent adjudicators.  Subjecting AOs to the 
Appointments Clause will mitigate appearances of impropriety by placing 
authority to hire and fire outside the IRS.  Further, AOs are required to be 
appointed.  AOs wield significant authority in issuing final decisions that 
bind the IRS to settlement agreements with third parties.  The Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence has long required such appointment, but with the most 
recent opinion in Lucia, there is little doubt that AOs possess the necessary 
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